




Three attempts to replicate the moral licensing effect








Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Blanken, I., van de Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Meijers, M. H. C. (2014). Three attempts to replicate the moral
licensing effect. Social Psychology, 45(3), 232-238. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000189
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Original Article
Three Attempts to Replicate the
Moral Licensing Effect
Irene Blanken,1 Niels van de Ven,1 Marcel Zeelenberg,1 and Marijn H.C. Meijers2
1Tilburg University, The Netherlands, 2University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract. The present work includes three attempts to replicate the moral licensing effect by Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009). The original
authors found that writing about positive traits led to lower donations to charity and decreased cooperative behavior. The first two replication
attempts (student samples, 95% power based on the initial findings, NStudy1 = 105, NStudy2 = 150), did not confirm the original results. The third
replication attempt (MTurk sample, 95% power based on a meta-analysis on self-licensing, N = 940) also did not confirm the moral licensing
effect. We conclude that (1) there is as of yet no strong support for the moral self-regulation framework proposed in Sachdeva et al. (2009) (2)
the manipulation used is unlikely to induce moral licensing, and (3) studies on moral licensing should use a neutral control condition.
Keywords: moral licensing, moral cleansing, self-regulation, replication
People like to present themselves as good people, both to
themselves and to others, to maintain a positive self-image
and to feel like a moral person (Aronson, Cohen, & Nail,
1999; Schlenker, 1980; Steele, 1988). Furthermore, central
theories of human behavior highlight humans’ desire for
cognitive consistency in their thoughts, feelings, and behav-
ior (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1946). Intriguing research on
moral licensing qualifies this desire for consistency by sug-
gesting that individuals who behave in a morally laudable
way, later feel more justified to perform a morally question-
able action (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Miller &
Effron, 2010). Moral licensing is found to lead to a broad
spectrum of undesirable behaviors. For example, after
(reminders of) prior moral or socially desirable behavior
people displayed more prejudiced attitudes (Effron,
Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Monin & Miller, 2001), cheated
more (Jordan, Mullen, & Murninghan, 2011; Mazar &
Zhong, 2010), displayed a preference for hedonic over util-
itarian products (Khan & Dhar, 2006), and indulged more
in highly palatable foods (Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, &
Ramanathan, 2008).
An important contribution to the literature on moral
licensing examines how writing about one’s own positive
or negative traits can influence donations to charity and
cooperative behavior in a commons dilemma (Sachdeva,
Iliev, & Medin, 2009). In just 4 years since publication, this
paper has been cited 129 times (Google Scholar, November
27, 2013). Based on their findings, the authors argued that
this moral licensing effect can best be interpreted as part of
a larger moral self-regulation framework where internal
balancing of moral self-worth and the costs associated with
prosocial behavior determine whether one will display
(im)moral behavior. When the moral image of oneself is
established, an immoral action is allowed without the fear
of losing that moral image (moral licensing). However,
when one appears immoral to others, positive actions are
needed to restore the moral image (moral cleansing). The
studies of Sachdeva et al. (2009) comparing licensing with
neutral control conditions show medium-sized effect sizes
(d = 0.62 ([CL95] 0.11 to 1.35) for Study 1 and
d = 0.59 ([CL95] 0.12 to 1.30) for Study 3).1 However,
note that because of the small sample sizes (N = 14 to 17
per condition), the obtained effects have large variances,
implying that the true effect sizes could range from very
small to very large.
There are no published direct replication attempts of the
methodologies of Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) studies. Conway
and Peetz (2012) conducted a study that was similar to
Sachdeva et al.’s Study 1. However, this was not a direct
replication because they adapted the procedure and added
extra manipulations. We sought to replicate the studies by
Sachdeva et al. to obtain additional insight in the complete
moral self-regulation framework by testing for both moral
licensing and moral cleansing effects contrasted to a neutral
control condition.
We conducted high-powered replications of Sachdeva
et al.’s (2009) Study 1 and Study 3 in Dutch student sam-
ples with 95% statistical power based on the effect size
of the original studies. We did a third study with a US
sample via Amazon’s MTurk with 95% power based on
1 Note that the overall differences between the three conditions (moral licensing, moral cleansing, and the neutral control condition) of
Sachdeva et al.’s Study 1 and Study 3 were significant. For Study 1, no statistics on post hoc comparisons were reported. When
calculating the Cohen’s d effect sizes comparing the moral licensing with the neutral control conditions, we found that for both studies,
the confidence intervals included zero, indicating marginally significant moral licensing effects.
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the effect size that we obtained in our meta-analysis on self-
licensing (d = 0.26; Blanken, Van de Ven, & Zeelenberg,
2014). This study examined both dependent variables of
original Studies 1 and 3 in a counterbalanced order. For
all studies, we report how we determined our sample sizes,
all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures.
Study 1 – Replication of Sachdeva
et al.’s (2009) Study 1
Participants
Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009)
we calculated that at least 63 participants were needed to
achieve 95% power for the effect size of Sachdeva
et al.’s Study 1 (2009; N = 46). We planned to collect data
for one full week, and our sample consisted of 106 under-
graduate students who participated for course credit. One
was removed because this participant indicated a willing-
ness to donate €100 to charity, more than 32 standard devi-
ations from the mean donation response. The remaining
105 (25 males, 78 females, 2 unknown, Mage = 19.58) par-
ticipants included native Dutch students (83.3%), non-
native Dutch students (9.5%), and foreign students
(4.8%). Participants were randomly assigned to either the
positive trait (N = 35), negative trait (N = 34), or neutral
control condition (N = 36).
Materials and Procedure
Participants completed the study as the first of a series of
experiments behind separate desks in the laboratory. The
experimenter in the laboratory was blind to condition. Prior
to the experiment, participants provided their informed con-
sent. The experimenter guided participants to their desks
and instructed them to complete the paper-and-pencil
questionnaire.
We obtained the original paper-and-pencil questionnaire
from Sachdeva et al. (2009) and translated these materials
into Dutch (for all materials see supplements section).
The cover story indicated that the study was about hand-
writing styles. Depending on the assigned condition, partic-
ipants were exposed to either nine positive trait words, nine
negative trait words, or nine neutral words and were asked
to copy each word four times and think about each word for
5–10 s. Next, participants were asked to write a short story
about themselves including the words they just copied.
After this manipulation, participants responded to some
filler items. Subsequently, the main dependent variable was
presented. Participants read that the laboratory, in an effort
to increase social responsibility, asked all participants
whether they would like to contribute to a worthy cause.
If they would like to do so, they could pledge to make a
small donation to any good cause of their choice. They
were told that they would be reminded of their choice at
a later time via a confirmation e-mail from the experi-
menter. Participants could select to which cause(s) they
would like to donate (cancer research, animal rights, ending
world hunger, environmental preservation, human rights,
veteran’s affairs, or other) and how much they would be
willing to donate (from €0 up to €10 or another specified
amount). Finally, participants completed seven self-presen-
tation items from the Self-Monitoring scale (Lennox &
Wolfe, 1984) and a set of demographic measures.
Known Differences From Original Study
The only known difference between our replication and the
original Studies 1 and 2 of Sachdeva et al. (2009) was that
we ran this study in a laboratory at a Dutch university,
while the original study was conducted in a laboratory at
a USA university. When participants were asked to write
about the positive trait, neutral, or negative trait words,
we used the exact instruction of the original Study 2, which
explicitly stated that participants should use the nine given
words to write a story about themselves. This was not done
in Sachdeva et al.’s Study 1, although it was intended that
participants would do so. As such, for this replication, we
combined the best of Sachdeva et al.’s Study 1 (including
a control condition) and Study 2 (the manipulation with
the clearest instruction).
Results
Following our confirmatory analysis plan, we conducted
Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) analysis to test the effect of writing
about one’s own positive traits, negative traits, or neutral
words on donation amount. Table 1 contains the mean re-
sponses per condition and statistical tests. There were no
significant differences between the moral identity condi-
tions on donation amount.2 The results of an additional
regression model including gender, age, and ethnicity indi-
cated that none of these factors significantly predicted
donation amount (all ps  .321). A reviewer suggested that
self-monitoring might moderate the observed effects. It did
not, p = .086. Analysis details for all studies are available
in the supplements.
Exploratory Analysis
When reading the recalled stories, we noticed that 55.7% of
the participants violated the instructions by not writing
about themselves or by using the words in a negating
way (for instance, ‘‘Alyssa is a generally friendly person
2 A nonparametric independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test (which controls for the skewness of the data), also found a nonsignificant
effect, H(2) = 0.36, p = .837.
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with a caring and compassionate disposition’’ or ‘‘I am nei-
ther a very caring nor compassionate individual’’). When
we only used a post hoc selection of those that wrote about
their own positive traits (N = 28) and compared it to the
neutral control condition, there was still no difference on
donation amount (p = .756).
Study 2 – Replication of Sachdeva
et al.’s (2009) Study 3
Participants
Using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) we calculated that we
should include at least 96 participants in our study to
achieve 95% power for the effect size that Sachdeva
et al. (2009) obtained in their Study 3 (the original used
N = 46). We planned to collect data for one full week,
and our sample consisted of 150 undergraduate students
who participated for course credit (27 males, 122 females,
1 unknown, Mage = 20.34) and included native Dutch stu-
dents (87.3%), non-native Dutch students (7.3%), and for-
eign students (4.7%). All participants were randomly
assigned to either the positive trait condition (N = 49),
the negative trait condition (N = 52), or the neutral control
condition (N = 49).
Materials and Procedure
Participants first provided informed consent, and then com-
pleted the study as the first of a series of experiments. The
laboratory experimenter was blind to condition. The exper-
imenter led participants to a separate cubicle and instructed
them to complete the paper-and-pencil questionnaire.
The materials were the same as those in Study 1 except
that the dependent variable was a hypothetical commons
dilemma. In this commons dilemma, participants imagined
a scenario in which they were the manager of a midsized
industrial manufacturing plant. They read that all manufac-
turers reached an agreement to install filters to eliminate
toxic gasses and to run these filters 60% of the time. Run-
ning a filter was costly for the manufacturing plant, but
would be beneficial to society. To measure cooperative
behavior, participants were asked to indicate what percent-
age of time they would operate the filters, indicated on an
11-point scale from 0 (labeled 0%) to 10 (labeled 100%).
After the main dependent variable, participants
explained their decision and completed three secondary
measures; they estimated (1) the percentage of other man-
agers who would not cooperate, on the same 11-point scale;
(2) the amount of environmental damage expected when
the filters would be run less than the agreed 60% on an
11-point scale from 0 (none) to 10 (a great amount); and
(3) the likelihood of getting caught when operating the
filters less than 60% of the time on an 11-point scale from
0 (= impossible) to 10 (= certain). Finally, participants
completed the seven self-presentation items from the Self-
Monitoring scale (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) and a set of
demographic measures.
Known Differences From Original Study
The only known difference compared to the original study
is that we ran this study in a laboratory at a Dutch univer-
sity instead of a USA university.
Results
Following our confirmatory analysis plan, we conducted
Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) analysis to test the effect writing
about one’s own (im)moral traits on cooperation (the amount
of time participants were willing to run the filters). There were
no significant differences between the conditions on coopera-
tive behavior (Tabel 1).3 Furthermore, there were no effects
on the secondary variables (Table 2). The results of an addi-
tional regression model including gender, age, and ethnicity
indicated that none of these demographic variables predicted
cooperative behavior (all ps  .257). Self-monitoring did not
moderate the observed effects (p = .787).
Exploratory Analysis
We noticed that 48.5% of the participants violated the recall
instructions and did not write about their own traits or used
the words in a negating way. When we only used a post hoc
selection of those who actually wrote about their own posi-
tive traits (N = 42), there was still no difference on cooper-
ative behavior between the positive trait stories about
oneself and the neutral control condition (p = .197).
Study 3 – Replication of Sachdeva
et al.’s (2009) Study 1 and Study 3
With a General US Population Sample
on MTurk
Participants
Whereas in Study 1 and Study 2, we based our sample size
on a power analysis using the original studies, for Study 3
we did so based on the effect size of self-licensing that we
obtained in the preliminary data of our meta-analysis
(d = 0.26) (Blanken et al., 2014). We calculated with
G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) that we would need at least
918 participants in our study to achieve 95% power to find
a self-licensing effect. The sample was recruited on Mturk.
3 A nonparametric independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test (which controls for the not normally distributed data), also showed no effect,
H(2) = 2.87, p = .238.
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We included an instructional manipulation check to prevent
inattentive participants from starting the study (see Oppen-
heimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). Participants were
asked to provide an answer to three neutral questions about
stories and were explicitly instructed to answer ‘‘five’’ on
the first question, and ‘‘seven’’ on the second and third
question. Participants who did not follow these instructions
(N = 160) could not participate in our study. Our final sam-
ple consisted of 940 participants (449 males and 491 fe-
males, Mage = 33.41) who participated in exchange for
$1.80.4 All participants were randomly assigned to the po-
sitive trait condition (N = 306), the negative trait condition
(N = 308), or the neutral control condition (N = 326).
Materials and Procedure
Participants completed the study materials via the Qualtrics
survey program. Participants could subscribe to participate
in our study entitled ‘‘writing style and several questions’’ if
they had an MTurk approval rate that was higher than 95%
and if they lived in the US.
After finishing writing the stories with the positive
traits, negative traits, or neutral words, participants
answered the filler questions and both dependent measures
from Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) Study 1 (donation amount)
and Study 3 (cooperative behavior) in a counterbalanced
order. Subsequently, participants completed the self-
presentation items from the Self-Monitoring scale and a
set of demographic measures.
Known Differences From Original Study
The study was conducted online. We made two slight
changes to these materials to increase the credibility of
the online study. First, for the cover story, we instructed
participants that the study was about general writing styles
instead of handwriting, as the latter would not be believable
in an online study. Second, we changed the donation
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, sample sizes, and test statistics for dependent variables in all studies
Positive trait Neutral trait Negative trait
Dependent variable M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F p gp
2
Study 1, N = 105 35 36 34
Donation amounta 2.89 (3.64) 2.78 (3.83) 2.35 (3.28) 0.21 .810 .004
Study 2, N = 150 49 49 52
Cooperative behavior 6.29 (1.14) 5.88 (1.49) 5.84 (1.37) 1.70 .187 .023
Study 3, N = 940 306 326 308
Donation amount 4.52 (2.91) 4.60 (3.11) 5.10 (3.18) 3.20 .041 .007
Cooperative behavior 6.27 (1.58) 6.39 (1.78) 6.21 (1.60) 0.78 .457 .002
Notes. For donation amount the answers could range from €0 to €10 (or participants could indicate another amount). For cooperative
behavior, the answers indicate how long participants would choose to do the costly cooperative act in the scenario (run filters), on a
range from 0 (the least cooperative) to 10 (the most cooperative). The statistical test of Study 3 is the main effect, controlling for order
effects. Effect sizes and Confidence Intervals for the moral licensing and moral cleansing effects can be found in the Forest plots
(Figures 1 and 2). aFor the main dependent variable, participants were asked to indicate how much money they wanted to donate to a
good cause. If they did not answer this question, we interpreted their response as €0. When these participants were excluded from the
analysis, the results did not differ, F(2, 81) = 0.29, p = .747, gp
2 = .007.
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and test statistics for secondary measures in Studies 2 and 3
Positive trait Neutral trait Negative trait
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F p gp
2
Study 2, N = 150 49 49 52
Expected cooperative behavior of others 4.64 (2.56) 4.57 (2.55) 4.28 (2.74) 0.26 .770 .004
Estimated likelihood of getting caught 5.92 (1.80) 5.61 (1.85) 5.62 (1.75) 0.47 .624 .006
Negative consequences for the environment 7.22 (1.62) 6.90 (1.95) 6.62 (1.88) 1.41 .248 .019
Study 3, N = 940 306 326 308
Expected cooperative behavior of others 4.72 (2.91) 4.89 (3.08) 4.51 (2.86) 1.30 .273 .003
Estimated likelihood of getting caught 6.91 (2.07) 7.09 (2.14) 7.05 (2.02) 0.63 .535 .001
Negative consequences for the environment 5.84 (2.04) 5.98 (2.11) 5.93 (1.99) 0.33 .721 .001
Notes. For expected cooperative behavior of others, answers could range from 0 (the least cooperative) to 10 (the most cooperative).
For estimated likelihood of getting caught, answers could range from 1 (impossible) to 10 (certain). For negative consequences for the
environment, answers could range from 1 (none) to 10 (a great amount).
4 We set the target higher than 918 to ensure a minimum of 918 valid participants after data exclusion.
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measure. We told participants that 10 of them would be
randomly selected to win an additional $10 MTurk worker
bonus. They were then asked that if they were one of the
winners, would they be willing to donate a portion of this
bonus to a cause of their choice from a list (cancer research,
animal rights, ending world hunger, environmental preser-
vation, human rights, veteran’s affairs, or other). Partici-
pants selected a cause and indicated the amount they
would donate ranging from $0 to $10 (or more).
Results
Donations
Following our confirmatory analysis plan, we conducted
Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) analyses to test the effect of writing
about (im)moral traits on how much participants would want
to donate to a good cause. We controlled for order effects by
including the order in which the two dependent variables were
presented as a separate independent variable in the model.
Order did not affect the donation amount, F(1, 934) = 0.78,
p = .378, gp
2 = .001, nor was there an interaction effect of or-
der with the manipulation of what words participants wrote
about, F(2, 934) = 0.42, p = .656, gp
2 = .001.
As Table 1 shows, there was a main effect of moral
identity condition on donation amount.5 Post hoc Tukey
tests indicated that participants in the negative trait condi-
tion donated more money than participants in the positive
trait condition (p = .044) and participants in the neutral
control condition (p = .020). There was no difference in
donation amount between participants in the positive trait
condition and participants in the neutral control condition
(p = .729). Thus, we did not find a moral licensing effect,
but we did observe a moral cleansing effect – the recall
of negative traits increased subsequent moral behavior.
Self-monitoring did not moderate the observed effects.
Of the demographic variables gender, age, education
level, family income, and ethnicity, only age significantly
influenced donation amount (b = .11, t(930) = 3.36,
p < .001). When we included age as a covariate to the
effect of the manipulation on donation amount, the effect
of the manipulation remained significant, F(2, 932) =
3.15, p = .043, gp
2 = .007.
Cooperative Behavior
Next, we conducted Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) analyses to
test the effect of moral identity condition on cooperation
in a hypothetical commons dilemma. The order in which
the dependent variables were presented did affect coopera-
tive behavior, F(1, 934) = 11.20, p = .001, gp
2 = .012,
with participants who first completed the donation depen-
dent variable displaying slightly more cooperative behavior
(M = 6.47, SD = 1.77) than participants who first com-
pleted this cooperative behavior dependent variable
(M = 6.11, SD = 1.52). The interaction between moral
identity and order was not significant, F(2, 934) = 0.83,
p = .438, gp
2 = .002. We do not know why this order effect
exists, but for the current study it is mainly important that
we control for this possible influence by adding it as a fac-
tor in the analyses. As Table 1 shows, there was no main
effect of moral identity on cooperative behavior,6 nor on
the secondary variables (see Table 2). Again, self-monitor-
ing did not moderate the observed effects.
Of the demographic variables, only one of the ethnicity
dummy variables significantly influenced cooperation (with
African Americans cooperating less than others, b = .19,
t(930) = 3.11, p = .002). When including ethnicity as a
covariate, there was still no effect of moral identity condi-




We noticed that 43.6% of the participants violated the recall
instructions and did not write about their own traits or used
the words in a negating way. Using solely the coded stories
about oneself in our analyses, there was a main effect of
moral identity condition on donation amount (p = .020)
with participants in the negative trait condition donating
more money than participants in the positive trait condition
(p = .017) and in the neutral control condition (p = .009).
There was no main effect of moral identity condition on
cooperative behavior (p = .495).
General Discussion
We made three attempts to replicate the findings of Sachdeva
et al. (2009) on moral licensing, with samples based on pre-
calculated power and preplanned analyses. In the first two
replication attempts using student samples, the data did
not confirm the original results. In our third replication at-
tempt using a general population sample the data did not
confirm the moral licensing effect. We did, however, find
support for the moral cleansing effect on one of the two
dependent variables in Study 3, but not in Studies 1 and 2.
Current Status of the Moral Licensing Effect
We conducted a meta-analysis of this moral licensing effect
by including both the original Studies 1 and 3 by Sachdeva
et al. and the three current replication attempts, using the
metafor package of Viechtbauer (2010). For our Study 3,
5 A nonparametric independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test (which controls for the skewness of the data), found a similar effect,
H(2) = 5.85, p = .054.
6 A nonparametric independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test (which controls for the not normally distributed data), also found a
nonsignificant effect, H(2) = 2.68, p = .713.
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we used the average effect size of the two dependent variables.
The random effects meta-analysis including all five studies
produced a mean effect size of moral licensing of d = 0.07
([CL95] 0.20 to 0.35). There was thus no significant moral
licensing effect across studies (z = 0.52, p = .603). Figure 1
contains an overview of all moral licensing effect sizes (when
compared to the neutral control conditions).
Current Status of the Moral Cleansing Effect
We conducted a meta-analysis of this moral cleansing effect
by including both the original Studies 1 and 3 by Sachdeva
et al. and the three current replication attempts. The random
effects meta-analysis including all five studies produced a
mean effect size of moral cleansing of d = 0.04 ([CL95]
0.11 to 0.20). There was thus no significant moral cleansing
effect across studies (z = 0.53, p = .593). Figure 2 contains
an overview of all moral cleansing effect sizes (when com-
pared to the neutral control conditions). However, note that
only a small number of participants in the moral cleansing
condition of the replication studies actually wrote about
themselves.
Possible Limitations of Our Replication
Attempts
Although we did our best to design direct replications of the
original studies, differences are inevitable, and some of
those may be consequential for moderating the results.
First, our Studies 1 and 2 used Dutch students not US stu-
dents. There is no theoretical reason to expect different
licensing effects for Dutch compared to US citizens, but
our pilot test (see supplements) suggested that words in
the positive moral trait condition were seen to be slightly
more positive in the US than in the Netherlands. Even so,
the words were evaluated very positively in both national
samples. Study 3 used a US based sample, but this study
differed on two aspects compared to the original study. It
was conducted online instead of in the laboratory, and the
manipulation involved donating a part of potential
winnings instead of money out-of-pocket. We cannot rule
out that these procedural differences were consequential,
but there presently exists no theoretical reason or
identification of these as boundary conditions on moral
licensing.
Conclusion
Although Sachdeva et al. (2009) theorized that moral
licensing and moral cleansing should be considered jointly
as being part of a moral self-regulation process, our three
high-powered studies did not replicate the key moral licens-
ing effect. Further, the meta-analytic result suggests that the
present state of evidence with this paradigm is not different
from a null effect. Sachdeva et al. (2009, p. 524) suggested
that their findings showed that ‘‘moral-licensing and moral-
Figure 1. Forest plot including
all comparisons between the
moral licensing and neutral con-
trol conditions of the original
studies by Sachdeva et al.
(2009) and our replication
attempts.
Figure 2. Forest plot including
all comparisons between the
moral cleansing and neutral
control conditions of the origi-
nal studies by Sachdeva et al.
(2009) and our replication
attempts.
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cleansing effects can act convergently as part of a moral
self-regulation process.’’ Based on the present findings,
we do not argue that the theory is incorrect, only that it
lacks sufficient empirical support when using the Sachdeva
et al. (2009) paradigm.
We suggest three concrete steps to clarify the effects of
moral licensing on social judgment. First, the method used
by Sachdeva et al. (2009) seems unlikely to elicit moral
licensing, especially since many participants violated the
recall instructions and did not write about their own traits
or used the words in a negating way. This is a procedure-
specific issue; it does not invalidate moral licensing more
generally. Second, the meta-analysis of all licensing re-
search suggests that the effect is relatively small (Blanken
et al., 2014). Therefore, small sample studies are highly
inadvisable as they would need to leverage chance to detect
a result using null hypothesis significance testing. Third,
because moral licensing and moral cleansing are theoreti-
cally distinct, it is important to use a neutral control condi-
tion to clarify the role of each in social judgment.
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